Abstract: Some, but not all, closed terms of the lambda calculus have types; these types are exactly the theorems of intuitionistic implicational logic. An extension of these simple (→) types to intersection (or →∧) types allows all closed lambda terms to have types. The corresponding →∧ logic, related to the Meyer-Routley minimal logic B + (without ∨), is weaker than the →∧ fragment of intuitionistic logic. In this paper we provide an introduction to the above work and also determine the →∧ logics that correspond to certain interesting subsystems of the full →∧ type theory.
S T L C
In standard mathematical notation "f : α → β" stands for "f is a function from α into β." If we interpret ":" as "∈" we have the rule: f : α → β t : α f(t) : β This is one of the formation rules of typed lambda calculus, except that there we write ft instead of f(t). In λ-calculus, λx.M represents the function f such that fx = M. This makes the following rule a natural one:
We now set up the λ-terms and their types more formally. 2. If α and β are types, then so is (α → β). (α → β) is an  .
D 4 (T A, C) If
M is a λ-term and α a type, M : α is a  . A  is a set of type assignments where the terms are distinct variables. Contexts are denoted by ∆, ∆ , ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . . D 5 (T T A S TA λ ) → types are assigned to λ-terms as follows:
We will sometimes write " λ " for the relation of this system, to distinguish it from other consequence relations.
D 6 (R, N F) λ-terms  when parts are replaced as follows:
A λ-term, no part of which can be reduced by (β) or (η), is said to be in   . If a term can be reduced to a term in strong normal form it is said to    .
(For more details on the λ-calculus see Hindley and Seldin [11] .)
We have the following type assignment:
We note that, looking only at the types in the above type assignment, we have a natural deduction style proof of a theorem of the intuitionistic implicational logic H → . The final term λy.λz.z(λx.yxx) is a very compact representation of the whole proof. Each application represents a modus ponens step and each λ-abstraction a use of the → introduction rule.
This applies in general:
(For details on TA λ , see Hindley [10] .)
I T
There are closed terms that do not have a simple type. For example, for the term λx.xx to have a type, we must have x : α → β as well as x : α, which is impossible in TA λ . An intersection type assignment x : (α → β) ∧ α allows x : α → β as well as x : α and so xx : β and λx.xx : (α → β) ∧ α → β. This is set up formally as follows:
2. If α and β are types, so are (α → β) and (α ∧ β).
D 10 (T T A S TA λ∧ ) Types are assigned to λ-terms by (Var), (→E), (→I) and the following rules: 
We will sometimes write " λ∧ " for the of this system.
The →∧ type theory was first introduced by Coppo and Dezani [5] . A useful survey article is Hindley [9] .
An alternative formulation of TA λ∧ replaces (∧E) and (η) by
where ≤ is a binary relation over types given by:
The standard (but equivalent) formulation replaces rule 6 by
We can define = by
The commutative and associative properties for ∧ are easy to prove. Meyer realised that the ≤-postulates relate to his and Routley's minimal relevance logic B + [13, 14] .
We will sometimes write " B + " for the of this system. Theorem 16 below, which is proved in [2] , provides us with a decision procedure for B + .
T 16 (D P  B + )
α ≤ β if and only if α is some intersection of atomic types a 1 , . . . , a n and arrow types (α 1 → γ 1 ), . . . , (α m → γ m ) and β is some intersection of atomic types b 1 , . . . , b k and arrow types (
. . , a n } and (ii) for each i where 1 ≤ i ≤ e, there are
so the result follows by Theorems 15 and 16.
T L  TA λ∧
As the types of TA λ were theorems of H → , a natural question arises: What logical system is represented by the types of TA λ∧ ? This question was answered for a combinatory logic version TA ∧ of TA λ∧ by Venneri [16] and thus, it was implicitly answered for TA λ∧ using translations to and from λ-terms to combinatory terms [1, 2] .
D 18 (C T)
1. S, K, I and variables are combinatory terms.
2. If X and Y are combinatory terms so is (XY) ().
Given a λ-term M we can find a corresponding combinatory term M H and, conversely, for each combinatory term X there is a λ-term X λ . The process of finding M H relies on the presence of a bracket abstraction operator λ * .
D 19 (H  λ)
Given λ * , a bracket abstraction operator, the maps H from λ-terms to combinatory terms, and λ from combinatory terms to λ terms are defined as follows:
The details of the abstraction operator λ * need not concern us here. The relevant requirement for a bracket abstraction operator is that it makes available the following equivalence.
T 20 If M is a λ-term, M λH = M. [7] or Dezani and Hindley [8] .
P Curry and Feys
The following is one of Venneri's equivalent type assignment systems for combinatory logic [16] that is best suited to our purposes:
where the new rule (∧I-s) is
where where s(α) is a substitution instance of α.
The Venneri Hilbert-style logic, which we call V, that corresponds to this is:
Any finite intersection of instances of the same axiom is a theorem of V.
Here ∆ is a set of formulas (or types) rather than a context.
The defined here will sometimes be written as " V ." Venneri then proves:
Note that this logic does not have (and cannot have) the full strength ∧I rule:
and that the ≤ rule is replaced using the Routley-Meyer logic B + .
We also have the following connection between λ and * : Theorem 24 shows that the logic V is also the logic of the types of TA λ∧ .
In [2] we proposed a λ-calculus version of Definition 21, TA λ∧ , from which a natural deduction style logic for TA λ∧ can be derived. This, of course, will be equivalent to V.
From this we define the corresponding natural deduction style logic.
The defined here will sometimes be written " V ." We show in [2] that:
where ∆ is ∆ with the 'x i :'s deleted.
I T S
Urzyczyn has shown in [15] that, given a ∆ and α, it is not decidable whether there is a term M such that ∆ M : α. Kurata and Takahashi [12] have shown that this property is decidable when the rule (∧I) (or (∧I-s) 
It is these distinct systems that we are interested in here.
T 30 The type systems in each of the following sets, denoted by the rules they have in addition to (), (→I) and (→E) are ≈ 1 -equivalent: T 33 The type systems having (), (→I) and (→E) (with, or without (η)) has the logic H → , but with formulas that may involve ∧.
P Obvious.
T 34 The type theory based on (), (→I), (→E) and (≤) together with either or both of (∧E) and (η) (i. e. system 2 in Theorem 30) has a logic based on (), (→I), (→E) and ().
P By an easy induction on the derivation of any ∆ M : α in the type theory, and an application of Theorem 15.
The remaining systems (3 and 7, on the one hand and 5 and 6 on the other) are ≈ 2 -equivalent to type systems with restrictions on the rules regarding ≤. To find the logics of types of these systems we need some results concerning the restricted (≤) rules and a weaker version of B + .
D 38 (T  B − )
The logic B − has axioms (a1) and (a4) and all the rules of B + .
P As for Venneri [16] P If, as before, we let ∆ be ∆ without the 'x i :'s we prove by induction on the derivation of ∆ M : α in this system, ∆ α in the given logic. For the type theory we use the system of rules, given in Theorem 36, that includes (≤ −2,3 ). Every proof step taken in the type theory has an obvious counterpart in the logic. In the case of (≤ −2,3 ) this is given by Lemma 39.
T 42 The type theory based on (), (→I), (→E), and (∧E) has the logic of types V , except with () replaced by, for arbitrary sets of formulas ∆:
The proof is as for Theorem 41 except that any use of ≤ 2,3 can be replaced by a use of one of the new axiom schemes.
R
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